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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 19-2753
_____________
IN RE: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS’
CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION
AMON GORDON,
Appellant
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-12-md-02323)
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a):
June 22, 2021
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and ROTH,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 24, 2021)
____________
OPINION*
____________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.

PORTER, Circuit Judge.
Amon Gordon, a retired National Football League (“NFL”) linebacker, seeks a
monetary award through the NFL’s concussion-settlement program. Gordon submitted a
claim through the settlement program, but his claim was denied. He appealed the denial
to the District Court, arguing that the Special Master who denied his claim misinterpreted
the settlement agreement. The District Court affirmed the Special Master’s interpretation,
and Gordon now appeals to this Court. However, in his briefing, Gordon abandons his
interpretive argument and instead argues that the District Court failed to adequately
explain its reasoning and the factual background of his claim. Gordon’s present argument
fails because the District Court fully analyzed and explained the interpretive question that
Gordon raised. The court’s failure to discuss background factual issues is irrelevant
because those issues were never presented to the court. We will therefore affirm.
I
A
This case arises out of the class-action settlement resolving retired NFL players’
claims that the NFL “failed to inform them of and protect them from the risks of
concussions in football.” In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig. (NFL
I), 821 F.3d 410, 420 (3d Cir. 2016).1 In 2015, after years of negotiation, the NFL and the
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Since the settlement, we have heard several appeals regarding issues in the
administration of the settlement. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion
Inj. Litig. (NFL II), 923 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2019); In re Nat’l Football League Players’
Concussion Inj. Litig. (NFL III), 814 F. App’x 678 (3d Cir. 2020); In re Nat’l Football
League Players’ Concussion Inj. Litig. (NFL IV), 962 F.3d 94 (3d Cir. 2020); In re Nat’l
2

former players reached a final agreement that was subsequently approved by the District
Court. Id. at 423. On appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s approval of the agreement,
id. at 448, and it became effective on January 7, 2017.
After the effective date, all former players seeking a diagnosis were required to go
through the same Baseline Assessment Program with physicians who were preapproved
by the NFL. But the agreement established a different set of requirements for former
players who had already received diagnoses from their personal physicians prior to the
effective date. Critical to this appeal, even though the agreement established a different
avenue for former players with pre-effective-date diagnoses, the agreement explained that
all diagnoses were still required to be “based on evaluation and evidence generally
consistent with” the diagnostic criteria used in the Baseline Assessment Program. App.
798. To ensure that pre-effective-date diagnoses are “generally consistent” with the
Program’s diagnostic criteria, the agreement requires that all pre-effective-date diagnoses
be reviewed by an advisory panel of approved physicians.
After the panel makes its determination, former players and the NFL have the right
to appeal the decision to the District Court. The District Court may refer appeals to a
“Special Master,” who may reverse the panel “upon a showing by the appellant of clear
and convincing evidence.” App. 702, 743, 866. In the event of such referral, either party
may appeal the Special Master’s decision to the District Court, but the settlement
agreement limits the court’s review. The factual determinations of the Special Master are

Football League Players’ Concussion Inj. Litig. (NFL V), 826 F. App’x 136 (3d Cir.
2020).
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“final and binding,” and the District Court’s review is limited to questions of law. App.
866.
B
The settlement agreement enables retired players to receive monetary relief if they
can show that they have a “Qualifying Diagnosis.” App. 734–36. Such diagnoses include:
(1) Early Dementia, (2) Moderate Dementia, (3) Alzheimer’s disease, (4) Parkinson’s
disease, and (5) amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”).
Early Dementia, the subject of this appeal, can be particularly difficult to quantify.
The Baseline Assessment Program diagnoses Early Dementia using five cognitive
“domains.” App. 798. The Program includes a battery of tests spread across the five
domains to estimate the degree of functional and cognitive impairment in an individual
case. But before the tests can determine whether a former player has concussion-induced
Early Dementia, the testing physicians must first estimate the player’s pre-injury
intellectual functioning. For the pre-injury baselines, the Baseline Assessment Program
classifies each former player into one of three categories: “Below Average,” “Average,”
or “Above Average.” App. 806. The Above Average category includes all players who
had an estimated pre-injury IQ above 110.
The examining physician then assesses the player’s current scores on a variety of
tests in each domain. If an individual score is far enough below what is expected for a
person with the same pre-injury baseline, the physician can infer that the player is
suffering from some sort of cognitive decline in that area. Impairment is based on the
degree of cognitive decline, not a raw score.
4

After the raw scores are compiled, the Baseline Assessment Program requires that
the scores be converted into T-scores2 to determine if the scores are enough standard
deviations below the expected range to indicate statistical significance. For a domain to
be considered “impaired,” a former player must have two scores in that domain that fall
below the standard-deviation threshold. App. 807–10. And to receive an Early Dementia
diagnosis, the former player must be impaired in two or more domains.
C
In 2017, Gordon submitted a claim for a monetary award because, two years prior
to the settlement, his personal physicians diagnosed him with Early Dementia. Because
Gordon received the diagnosis before the effective date, the diagnosis had to be reviewed
by the advisory panel. The panel approved Gordon’s claim and concluded that his preeffective-date diagnosis was generally consistent with the diagnostic criteria in the
Baseline Assessment Program. But after the panel had already issued its approval, a
neuropsychology consultant reviewed the application and recommended that the claim be
denied because Gordon’s personal physicians did not properly scale Gordon’s scores.

2

In his briefing, Gordon suggests that this T-score requirement is, in effect, requiring
“race-norming” and the unequal treatment of black players. Appellant’s Br. 29–33. The
NFL responds that the T-score requirement has nothing to do with norming and that it is
purely a statistical convention: “Scaled scores and T scores merely use different
numerical scales, thus the conversion of scaled to T scores is strictly mathematical and
linear (a scaled score is a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 3, while a T score is a
mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10).” Appellees’ Br. 23. However, that issue is
not before us on appeal. As Gordon’s own reply brief makes clear, this appeal is not
about race-norming: “[Gordon] raised the question of race norming as a possible
explanation for what transpired below, but specifically did NOT ask this Court to
consider that issue because the evidence is not before it.” Reply Br. 3 n.1.
5

Gordon’s claim was also flagged for an audit. After the audit, the panel again approved
Gordon’s claim and concluded that Gordon’s pre-effective-date diagnosis met the
Baseline Assessment Program criteria. In response, the NFL appealed to the Special
Master.
The parties agreed that Gordon belonged in the Above Average pre-injury
baseline. They also agreed that Gordon’s personal physicians used many of the same tests
that were part of the Baseline Assessment Program. But the NFL claimed that Gordon’s
personal physicians used improper “scaled scores” rather than the T-scores required by
the settlement, which skewed the results. App. 938. The NFL argued that when the scores
were properly converted to T-scores, Gordon failed to meet the Program’s criteria for an
Early Dementia diagnosis. The Special Master agreed with the NFL, concluding that the
diagnosis from Gordon’s personal physicians was not “generally consistent” with the
diagnostic standards in the settlement agreement. App. 1095. Further, the Special Master
concluded that Gordon’s test scores did not show the cognitive decline required for a
diagnosis, so he denied Gordon’s claim.
D
Gordon appealed the Special Master’s decision to the District Court. Because the
District Court’s jurisdiction is limited to legal issues, Gordon’s appeal was confined to a
single question: whether the Special Master erroneously required Gordon’s pre-effectivedate diagnosis to be “generally consistent” with the diagnostic standards listed in the
settlement’s Baseline Assessment Program. App. 949. In a well-reasoned and detailed
opinion, the District Court sided with the Special Master’s interpretation. The court
6

explained that, under the settlement, “[a]ll Qualifying Diagnoses must be made . . .
consistent with Exhibit 1,” and Exhibit 1 unequivocally states that “Retired NFL Football
Players diagnosed outside of the [Baseline Assessment Program]” must be diagnosed
“based on evaluation and evidence generally consistent with the [Baseline Assessment
Program] diagnostic criteria.” App. 2–3 (bold text in original). Thus, the District Court
concluded that “[t]he terms of the Settlement Agreement plainly state that the ‘generally
consistent’ standard applies to all Qualifying Diagnoses of [Early and Moderate
Dementia], including pre–Effective Date diagnoses.” App. 2.
E
Gordon timely appealed. However, he now completely abandons his argument
presented to the District Court. He concedes that all pre-effective-date diagnoses must be
“generally consistent” with the diagnostic criteria in the settlement’s Baseline
Assessment Program. Appellant’s Br. 6. He repeated this concession in his reply brief,
stating: “Plaintiff-Appellant withdrew any objection he had over the question of whether
a pre-effective date claim must be generally consistent with the other claim
determinations set forth in the Settlement Agreement, and never raised this issue again
after he raised it before Judge Brody and it was clarified.” Reply Br. 3 n.1. Instead,
Gordon now claims that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to explain its
reasoning for upholding the Special Master’s determination. Gordon presses no other
arguments.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, and
7

“retained jurisdiction over the administration of the Settlement Agreement.” NFL IV, 962
F.3d at 101. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
interpretation of the settlement agreement for clear error and its administration of the
settlement for abuse of discretion. NFL IV, 962 F.3d at 101.
III
Gordon made only one argument to the District Court: that his claim was not
required to be generally consistent with the Baseline Assessment Program. Rather than
press that argument here, Gordon now asks us to vacate and remand so the court “can
explain its reasoning.” Reply Br. 1. Gordon claims that the court’s analysis was an abuse
of discretion because he “cannot discern the factual basis for the District Court’s denial of
his award.” Reply Br. 2.
Gordon’s argument is meritless. The court cogently resolved the only question
before it: whether the diagnosis supporting Gordon’s claim had to be generally consistent
with the standards in the Baseline Assessment Program. Although Gordon claims that the
court should have given a more detailed account of the factual underpinnings of his
claim, those issues were not before the court and were not germane to its disposition of
Gordon’s legal objection. The District Court gave a well-reasoned and detailed analysis
of the issue Gordon raised. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion.
IV
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
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